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The historical roots of public 
diplomacy and their significance 
for India 
DAVID LOWE 
--~eot>>----
A T A TIME of ambitious, almost frightening plans for public diplomacy initiatives-consider, for example, the Chinese target 
for 1,000 overseas Confucius Institutes by the year 2020-it is easy to 
get caught up in a feeling of change without precedent in the pursuit of 
national interests overseas. In the spirit of debate and panel discussion, 
it is timely to look back as well as anticipate the future, not merely as 
an academic exercise to explore the historical roots of public diplo-
macy, but in a way that makes for better decision-making in where 
to go next. This is the case for a possible 'superpower', India, whose 
emergence in international relations is accompanied by significant 
ventures in what is referred to as 'new' public diplomacy. The 'new' 
refers both to the broadening of agents at work-public diplomacy 
now embracing relationships between civil society actors overseas, and 
encouraging constant contact between non-government actors-
and it sometimes also refers to the greater use of social media and 
instant communications in messages sent and received. 
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While thinking about the new, I suggest there are good reasons 
for recalling the old. There are three main strands of historical lineage 
that I think inform the idea of public diplomacy (referred to as PD 
hereafter). Furthermore, they are not merely remote origins from 
which the phenomenon has grown but they remain close to the sur-
face of current policy formulation and implementation in relation 
to PD, and therefore warrant remembering. These three strands are: 
nineteenth-century adventures between state and non-state actors; the 
rise of twentieth-century state-promoted propaganda; and the emer-
gence of internationalism as one of the most enduring bedrocks upon 
which new forms of diplomacy can be launched. In addition to these 
three strands of lineage, there are two further historical dimensions 
to the phenomenon that are only half-appreciated. The first of the 
half-appreciated is the role of history as a guide for decision-makers 
choosing between what works and what does not; the other is the need 
for what I would call a historical sensibility to accompany modern 
thinking about the slippery concept of national reputation. 
In putting this case, I take a generous view of PD as address-
ing a broad audience as a means of persuading others to want the 
same outcomes as you want. American commentator Bruce Gregory's 
elaboration seems about right. He reminds us of the action and agency 
in public diplomacy-the key verbs at work for state actors, he 
argues, are understanding cultures, attitudes and behaviour; building 
and managing relationships; and influencing opinions and actions to 
advance interests and values. 1 I would add two further qualities. The 
first is that the means of persuasion needs to be either originating from 
government or at least acknowledged, and somehow endorsed, by 
government; the second is that PD logically involves listening, in order 
to understand others, and respond accordingly. My perspective is that 
of an international historian, and my argument below is international 
as much as Indian in focus, but with at least suggestive attention to 
Indian circumstances. 
There are three strands of historical lineage logically informing 
PD. The first is one that prevailed for most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and featured shifting and loose relationships between nation 
states and non-state agencies shepherding national interests in cultural 
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transmissions overseas. It has been suggested that the 21st-century 
multi-dimensional mix of state and non-state forces involved in PD 
is something of a return to earlier times, after an unusually state-
centralised phase generated by the Second World War and then the 
Cold War. European examples of engagement with the United States 
are especially instructive. In France, the Alliance Franc;aise, founded 
in 1883, promoted French language and culture, and prize-winning 
French artists found themselves on sponsored tours to the United 
States at a time when popular opinion there was mostly hostile to 
the French. Similarly, German composers were at the forefront of the 
Germans' successful efforts around the turn of the century to educate 
overseas and especially US audiences in classical music. It was notable 
that, as was the case with Alliance Franc;aise, the state-the Reich 
government in Germany's case-stayed at arms length from these cul-
tural missions. The same was the case with stirring academic exchange 
programs (the Rhodes scholarships, for example) and European busi-
ness groups setting up co-operative societies with like-minded groups 
in trading nations. Colourful individuals could transcend colonial 
circumstances, as was the case with Bengali seer Swami Vivekananda, 
who turned up uninvited to the World Parliament of Religions in 
Chicago in 1893 and became the de facto Indian representative. An 
inspiring speaker, he brought Hinduism into popular consciousness, at 
the same time sketching its international reach in a way that captured 
diasporas and smoothed over divisions, and also harnessing it to the 
cause of Indian nationalists. As a conference gate-crasher, he did much 
to awaken the West to a Hindu spirituality that also harboured a 
morally superior form of nationalism. 2 
Whether or not the state liked these developments-and they were 
sometimes regarded with suspicion or disdain by foreign offices and 
embassies-does not detract from their significance and success. In 
all cases mentioned, the state eventually caught up with these private 
initiatives, conferring acknowledgement or endorsement. In short, 
those who see the end of the Cold War as unlocking features of the 
international environment that were kept in tight check for longer than 
anticipated might be able to draw on the recent resurgence of a less 
state-dominated idea of PD in evidence of their ideas. Stretching the 
108 THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER 
argument, we might say that private agents and public-private part-
nerships in nation branding or PD have their historical antecedents as 
much in the nineteenth as in the late twentieth or early 21st century.3 
The second strand of lineage is the story of propaganda and the 
bureaucracy supporting it during the first 60-odd years of the twentieth 
century, a period in which war-inspired ideals and modern bureaucra-
cies added a new sense of propaganda grown by and harnessed to 
a burgeoning national security state. While the term 'propaganda' 
carries some negative connotations, it also has a close relationship 
with PD, especially when we recall firstly that Edmund Gullion, 
dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts, widely regarded as the father of 
public diplomacy, said that he would have been comfortable with the 
term propaganda as something that covered his interest, but, due to 
propaganda's pejorative implications, was forced to search for a more 
neutral umbrella term.4 Others took a little longer to make the shift 
and it was only in the 1970s that the US government's information 
activities made the terminological shift to PD and left behind the 
previously well-used umbrella term of propaganda.5 The pejorative feel 
of other terms, such as information warfare, psychological operations, 
information campaigns-terms that have become common since the 
Second World War-can obscure a basic aim shared with PD. They 
are dimensions of a nation's attempt to cultivate public opinion to 
achieve that nation's aims, or put in a way that the advocates of 'soft 
power' would like, they are one form of persuasion orchestrated in 
national interests. 
There are, in fact, some strong roots to the state-centred 
propaganda generation that pre-date the Second World War. Towards 
the end of the First World War a mix of revulsion at the horrors of war 
and excitement about communications advances in radio, telegraph 
and the press fed also into US President Woodrow Wilson's liberal 
ideas about the rule of international law and self-determination for 
a better, more morally based world order. From the non-state world, 
new and very active educational and philanthropic foundations (such 
as the Rockefeller and the Guggenheim) forced the Americans to adapt 
and to try to manage the new overseas initiatives that stemmed from 
sources other than Washington. From such developments come the 
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first exercises in what commentators call 'cultural diplomacy' and from 
this era come the stirrings of liberal internationalism, which is a theme 
warranting separate attention. But Woodrow Wilson's new Committee 
on Public Information, 1917-19, was also an extraordinarily successful 
propaganda campaign towards public support for US participation 
in the war, involving close to 150,000 workers in various message-
making and disseminating activities. 6 
Just as international affairs during the first half of the twentieth 
century were dominated by two world wars, it was war-generated 
bureaucracy that enabled the growth of large propaganda machines, 
especially during the Second World War. In simple terms, the war 
called for concerted efforts in the production of politically strong mes-
sages closely linked to the aims of key combatants, and these settings 
changed only slowly in the post-war years, partly because a new war, 
the Cold War, quickly replaced the last one, and partly because it would 
take time for new modalities and greater subtlety to grow.7 In 1959, 
for example, William Benton, former US Assistant Secretary of State, 
reflected on the recent reciprocating art exhibitions held in Moscow 
and New York under a US-USSR cultural exchange agreement. The 
US State Department, he wrote, was 'in the propaganda business ... 
The State Department will always be in the propaganda business and 
will never be in the art business. ''Art" judged from the standpoint of 
the US Government and its Congressional appropriations, applied to 
overseas activities, must always be judged from its impact as propa-
ganda-and never from its impact as art.' 8 Such comments do little to 
divest propaganda of its pejorative connotations. Benton was, of course, 
a Cold War Warrior. His view exemplifies the state's heavy-handed and 
manipulative information campaigns of the Cold War. 
Before the Cold War, the Second World War stirred all of the 
bigger states into action, and the appallingly successful work of Joseph 
Goebbels in Nazi Germany is particularly well remembered. But, when 
stripped of its pejorative connotation, the links between state-directed 
propaganda and recent state efforts in PD are significant. Information 
generated by the state for consumption by those whose interests the 
state wishes to help shape can be imaginative and nuanced but it is 
seldom innocent. According to our definitions, the main difference 
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lies in the two-way nature of PD, the listening aspect implicit in Bruce 
Gregory's definition and more explicit in others' thinking. If we were 
always certain that PD initiatives carried with them an unwavering 
commitment to listen, to be very responsive to feedback, then perhaps 
they could escape the vestiges of propaganda; but as it is very hard 
to claim this for all actions that go under the heading of PD, and as 
assessing the effectiveness of PD according to responses is patchy and 
a work in progress, I think the connection with propaganda is hard 
to shake completely-even if there is a general aversion to the use of 
the term. 
The third historical strand to current-day PD is the growth of 
internationalism, both at state and non-state levels, during the last cen-
tury and early years of this one. At the supranational level, the growth 
of the United Nations membership and UN auxiliary bodies from the 
late 1940s through to the 1960s presented big, well-structured oppor-
tunities for PD. The timing of this blossoming, of course, coincided 
with India's emergence as an independent state. Early ventures in 
post-Independence Indian PD, I suggest, were less bilateral than 
in the supranational context of the UN. Through the principles and 
ideals they championed, nations of the Non-Aligned Movement stir-
ring in the mid-1950s, with Nehru as one of the founding fathers, 
reinforced the Charter of the United Nation's aims and promoted the 
further development of an international community. As is well known, 
Indian hopes for the UN were closely entwined with hopes for post-
colonial India itself, and for humanity more generally. Gandhi's Quit 
India Declaration in Bombay in 1942 stressed that India's nationalism 
spelt internationalism, foreseeing the need for independent India to 
join a world federation of free nations that would ensure disarma-
ment, general peace and security, address the problems of injustice 
and inequalities, and prevent aggression and exploitation of others. 
Jawaharlal Nehru's subsequent declarations and writings extended 
these ideas, especially during the first decade of the UN, to 1956. 
Other Indians helped, including the impossible-to-forget Krishna 
Menon, but in addition, Nehru's sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who 
headed the Indian delegation to the United Nations, and who was the 
first woman to be elected President of the General Assembly in 1953; 
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and also India's Representative to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Hansa Mehta, who was at the time a member of India's 
Constituent Assembly. This is not the place to re-examine the detail 
of Nehruvian hopes for 'one worldism', for world government collec-
tivism to eventually replace nation-states, and for the UN to become 
the 'conscience of the world'. My main purpose is to recall that this 
was very public, broad-based diplomacy aimed at mobilising public 
opinion in a number of nations. One recent reappraisal of this period 
suggests that we see it as one of the 'co-mingling or intermingling' 
of ideas about post-colonial India and about the post-colonial world 
order, terminology that is less loaded with morality and identity, and 
which is useful for building bridges within current debates.9 
The General Assembly debates quickly took on a public affairs 
dimension, especially as the Non-Aligned Movement grew more 
organised and bold from the mid-1950s through to the 1960s. The 
famous Resolution 1514 in 1960, requiring the granting of imme-
diate independence to colonial countries and peoples, was notable 
for more than its sweeping aside previous Assembly's acquiescence 
in colonial powers waiting for social, economic and educational pre-
paredness before conferring indepedence. It was also a moment of 
huge Non-Alignment and (then) Third World solidarity. The issue 
of decolonisation stayed to the fore of the General Assembly debates, 
and the resolution was revisited throughout the 1960s. Significantly, 
too, there was, in the wake of Resolution 1514 a successful mobilisa-
tion of the UN's information bureaucracy-the UN Department of 
Public Information. This department became a focal point for the 
Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 seized on the nexus 
between information and power, who were keen to direct messages 
of incomplete development and social and economic injustices at 
the 'North'. 10 Similarly, the growth in UNESCO activity provided 
for publicly known reform agendas that mapped easily on to Nehru's 
humanism and optimism. 11 
Even without Nehru and without supranationalism, when we read 
the history of international relations by measures other than military 
power, strategy, alliances and mobilising for war, it enables the cul-
tural, educational, social and other networks informing relationships 
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to come to the fore. This is what is sometimes referred to as 'cultural 
internationalism', and it offers a means of understanding international 
relations that we have sometimes overlooked. 12 As another example, in 
which India also has a strong presence, it is worth recalling the post-war 
Colombo Plan for aid to South and South East Asia, a Commonwealth 
and then broader-based exercise in aid and education exchange. The 
Colombo Plan was a very worthy umbrella scheme under which a 
series of bilateral aid arrangements operated. As with many other aid 
initiatives, its impact was sometimes countered by fluctuations in 
commodity prices and by trade protection, but it generated a lot of 
human-interest stories. 
In fact, the Colombo Plan became dependent on the generation 
of information for its success, and it is instructive to tease out a little 
of the PD detail that emerged. In practice, information generation was 
in the hands of a small but highly industrious group of officials. They 
included Indians who served as information officers, R. K. Chatterjee 
and B. L. Sharma, and India's Government Registrar of Newspapers 
M. L. Bhardwaj, who took every opportunity to spread messages of aid, 
endeavour, growth and identity. A small Colombo Plan Information 
Unit was created in 1953-54, and by 1958 it had merged with the 
Bureau for Technical Co-operation, that side of the plan focusing 
on education, training and technical expertise. In gathering stories 
and photos for use in journals and pamphlets, the bureau more 
than made up for the lack of a permanent secretariat. 13 In 1957, the 
regular meeting of members of the Colombo Plan's Consultative 
Committee confirmed something of a new era in information activity. 
The meeting featured strong consensus that members should do 
more to disseminate information about the plan through established 
information media-the press, radio and, where possible, television. 14 
Delegates at the conference agreed that new economic development 
and training efforts should be accompanied by bold new measures to 
carry the good word about the plan's projects further, both at home 
and overseas. Information was reified by members, and it became 
crucial to a broader-based acceptance among peoples of both donor 
and recipient nations, of the transformation of the Colombo Plan 
from post-war experiment to longer-term partnerships between the 
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so-called 'old Commonwealth' nations, Japan and the United States, 
on the one hand, and developing nations of South and South East Asia 
(noting that some countries were both donors and beneficiaries of aid). 
One immediate outcome was the mobilisation of a new mul-
tinational group of cultural ambassadors, the national information 
officers of participating countries. Like India, Australia was prominent 
in occupying offices central to the information drive. Australia's suc-
cessful involvement in the Colombo Plan in an era before the end 
of 'White Australia' required its inscription in the memories of most 
Australians as a 'worthy cause', however tinged with patronising views 
of change in Asia. This process, in turn, owed much to the growth 
of an information bureaucracy born in the Second World War, and 
transformed in the 1950s and 1960s into one partly preoccupied with 
the Cold War but also one tasked with generating positive images 
about immigration as a vital stage of Australia's post-war development, 
and images designed to build bridges of cautious engagement with 
the elites of post-colonial Asia. Again, it was not an innocent medium 
for messages about Asia-the work of Australia's post-war Australian 
News and Information Bureau still bore traces of propaganda efforts 
inspired by wars hot and cold-but it was an important one. 15 
Thus, the phenomenon of wielding a new information bureau-
cracy was most important to those newly independent nations, 
including India, looking to project messages. Newly independent 
nations might not have inherited a war-bred propaganda bureaucracy 
but they quickly realised the importance of generating messages for 
broad audiences. Building arguments around the growth of bureaucra-
cies may not always be exciting as new PD in the age of Twitter, but 
as most forms of diplomacy are fundamentally about the management 
of change, so do our arguments about what is new and distinctive 
about PD need to embrace the growth and changes in bureaucracies 
supporting diplomacy. 
There are two further uses of history in whatever happens today: 
one instrumental and the other more poetic. As a historian, what I 
am now suggesting will sound like special pleading, but I do think 
historical grounding of PD is valuable. In part, such grounding serves 
to anchor a concept that can be over-used and can be over-burdened 
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with expectations. We are today experiencing a rise in diplomatic 
activity that coincides with a strong sense of transition in the global 
system (or systems) wrought by financial crises of unpredictable timing 
and duration, acts and recurring threats of terrorism, significant power 
shifts, especially in Asia and the Pacific, and implied levels of policy 
co-ordination on unprecedented scale across and within nations in 
tackling the challenges of climate change. Not surprisingly, in this 
context, PD, as a concept, is bound to be over-used and carry too 
many hopes at times. 
Thus, the first, more pragmatic use of history, is as a provider of 
lessons. Others have begun this task. Historian-PD expert Nick Cull 
has started to compile historical case studies in PD, lessons of what 
worked and what didn't, and he calls for more, so that we end up with 
a 'public diplomacy playbook' as a next-phase capacity builder. 16 For 
example, the US Shared Values campaign of 2001-02 in the wake of 
9/11 addressed the wrong problem. Millions of dollars were spent on 
showing to the Arab world that Arab-Americans lived well in a land 
that was tolerant and strong on family values. The trouble was, the 
Arab world saw the US more according to actions in the Middle East 
than according to domestic conditions, and therefore did not change 
their views. This was after initial market testing yielded understand-
ably positive feedback for the message in the campaign. 17 
It is especially easy for political leaders to convey messages, based 
on a sense of history, that can enhance or detract from their nation's 
standing among others. History has a tendency to appear in politicians' 
speech in crisis-like moments. There is now considerable literature on 
the power of historical metaphors to influence policy-makers under 
stress, or lessons that we supposedly learn from previous episodes. 
Wars tend to be remembered, at least in their early stages, according 
to memories of the last wars that people were involved in. 
You do not have to be particularly beholden to psychological 
explanations in order to assume that people who either lived through 
the times or who were growing up 'learning the lessons' and being 
exposed to this form of popular history were likely to be affected. The 
Second World War has a particularly strong hold on the American 
imagination, as was shown by the repeated references to Pearl Harbor 
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after the 9/11 attack in 2001. Later, in August 2007, in a less crisis-
like moment, President Bush even attempted to draw a historical line 
between US involvement in the post-war reconstruction of Japan after 
1945, and the ongoing war in Iraq. Bush likened Al-Qaeda's attacks 
on the US and its allies to those of Japan in the Second World War 
and then reminded listeners of opposition to US-led rebuilding of 
the Japanese economy (successfully) after the war, inviting them to 
view the US occupation of Iraq in the same terms. Bush omitted the 
Cold War context in which Japan was restored as bulwark against 
the Soviet Union and China. His selective and mangled efforts were 
rightly criticised by historians of post-war Japan such as John Dower. 18 
And the other reason for historical perspective is the value of his-
tory as compelling narrative with the longer view, and power to evoke. 
Effective story-telling that is linked to felt and demonstrated truths is, 
afterall, one of the most powerful means of persuasion or reinforcing 
a message. Well-known stories or histories tend to shape national 
reputation, and the best-known stories leave lasting impressions. The 
motto of one of the biggest and best-known information services, the 
US Information Agency, was 'Telling America's Story to the World'. 
I agree with Dutch commentator Jan Melissen that PD, when prac-
tised effectively, runs at different speeds from the more traditional 
forms of diplomacy and often has the medium- to longer-term view in 
sight. Interestingly, Melissen is an authority on so-called 'new public 
diplomacy', emphasising greater real time and greater horizontality 
in communications by state and non-state actors and the blurring 
of domestic and international news domains. 19 He suggests that PD 
should ideally be in tune with a country's medium-term foreign policy 
objectives and long-term aims. It builds on trust and credibility and 
often works best with the long-term horizon. In the nearer term, 
he suggests, it is 'realistic to aspire to influencing the milieu factors 
that constitute the psychological and political environment in which 
attitudes and policies towards other countries are debated' .20 
In broad terms, political leaders have shown a preparedness to 
engage with audiences through a dialogue informed by history. The 
nature of political speech is itself profoundly influenced, explicitly and 
otherwise, by the competing meanings to be drawn from history. In the 
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appeal to 'thresholds', 'turning points' and 'unique opportunities' a 
sense of history is inevitably invoked. 
Underpinning all such debates is a sense that history can frame 
and provide authority to politicians' efforts to mobilise public support. 
This has been recognised in Australia. Five years ago, the participants 
in the August 2006 Australian History Summit investigating the teach-
ing of history in secondary schools agreed that knowledge of Australian 
history was vital for young Australians, and concluded: 'Nearly all of 
the crucial public debates embody and appeal to history.'21 Here is 
acknowledgement that history has had persuasive, mobilising appeal 
in Australian politics. 
This, in turn, begs important questions: Is this what people vote 
for? Do they respond to certain persuasive ideals, ideas and feelings 
in ways that go well beyond carefully calculating self-interest? Are 
they interested in a nation's standing in international affairs? Are they 
concerned with more than who will give them a better deal according 
to taxation and opportunity, and security at home and abroad? 
American linguist George Lakoff, in his wonderfully titled little 
book, Don)t Think of an Elephant, answers with cautious 'yes' to these 
questions. In the US an academic cottage industry has grown up around 
the tendency for voters to behave outside the norms of rational, self-
interested behaviour. An example that Lakoff uses is the 2003 race for 
Governor of California. Focus groups monitoring the campaigns kept 
finding that voters would respond to a series of questions by identifying 
that Democrat Gray Davis's policies were most closely aligned to what 
they described as their interests-but then added that they would vote 
for Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger. They were, concludes Lakoff, 
voting for identity and values more than self-interest. And this trend 
was observed at the national level in the United States. It prompted a 
new wave of writing about how to frame the debate-how conservatives 
had largely won the struggle for language in many ways. According to 
Lakoff, prior to Obama's victory, conservatives had effectively wielded 
the old 'nation as family' metaphorical toolkit (the world is a dangerous 
place and families need protection; in a difficult world, children need 
help to tell right from wrong). The family metaphor came with all the 
expectations that stern, paternal discipline should guide children; that 
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father's authority should not be challenged (i.e. strong support must be 
given to presidents in relation to foreign policy etc); and that welfare 
is dangerously akin to maternal indulgence, which leads to wayward 
behaviour etc. Underpinning these suggestions is the idea that sound, 
strict morality is what leads to prosperity and security.22 While history 
wasn't always at the forefront of this type of analysis, the authority from 
this kind of language is buttressed by the effective wielding of historical 
examples. In the US context, such work follows other commentators 
who have highlighted the effective wielding of rhetoric by former US 
President Ronald Reagan, the 'great communicator'. Richard Reeves's 
2006 study of President Reagan argues that his charisma resulted from 
his disregard of the nitty-gritty, his strong sense of the world historical 
in his actions and in his belief that 'the speech' was the real work. 23 
There is strong logic, therefore, to set aside prime ministers or presi-
dents or party leaders as a category for special attention in any analysis 
of their impact on PD. 
Margaret Thatcher, on the rise in 1979, made a speech to her 
Conservative Party in which she invoked Britain's proud history as 
the world leader, in order to reignite conservative pride. A couple of 
snippets serve here as examples: 
The world has never offered us an easy living. There is no reason 
why it should. We have always had to go out and earn our living-
the hard way. In the past we did not hesitate. We had great technical 
skill, quality, reliability. We built well, sold well. We delivered on 
time. The world bought British and British was best. Not German. 
Not Japanese. British. It was more than that. We knew that to keep 
ahead we had to change. People looked to us as the front runner 
for the future. 24 
'Our success', she said, 'was not based on Government hand-outs, 
on protecting yesterday's jobs'. And she used this description of the 
British work ethic as a basis for sweeping industrial reform after she 
came to power. Ten years later she spoke of Britain's special contribu-
tions to Europe at war and, without any imperial misgivings, about 
Europeans' 'civilisation' of much of the world as 'an extraordinary tale 
of talent, skill and courage'.25 Today, the legacy of the Second World 
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War, especially in Europe, is formidable in its capacity to remind 
people that there is plenty of unfinished business; and we can find 
many other examples of European leaders having to tread carefully 
and deliberately around some of the many residual wounds and 
grievances that continue to resonate strongly. 
Politicians have been adept in using history in very public ways 
that have a more reconciliatory purpose, which again, carries a more 
international message easily digested. For example, in Germany in 
2005, Chancellor Schroder knew how important it was to reject a 
particularly victim-laden interpretation of Germany's recent past. On 
the 60th anniversary of the horrific Allied fire-bombing of Dresden, 
he engaged in a very public repudiation of neo-Nazi historical revision. 
This was part of Schroder's ongoing rejection of the calls made by an 
increasingly popular neo-Nazi political party for historical revisionism, 
in which Germans were to be recast as the victims of the Second 
World War. The National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) had 
announced plans to stage a 'funeral march' (Trauermarsch) through the 
middle of Dresden on 13 February 2005 to hijack the 60th anniversary 
of the bombing. NPD members of the Saxony state parliament called 
the Dresden raid a 'bombing holocaust' (Bombenholocaust) and accused 
the Western Allied 'imperialist air-gangsters' who conducted the 
raid of being war criminals. The key phrase from Schroder's statement 
widely quoted in the (inter)national media was his vow 'not to allow 
cause and effect to be reversed', a reference to the NPD's version of 
history in which Germans were cast in the role of victims. Chancellor 
Schroder was an advocate of the idea that German nationalism always 
must be viewed through the prism of Auschwitz. In arguing this way, 
Schroder successfully restored a sense of what was cause and what was 
effect in German history, and thereby framed a sense of nation in a 
modern context.26 
As another powerful example of a leader's attempt at reconcilation 
that drew on a sense of history, we could also consider US President 
Barack Obama's speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in June 
2009. This was a prime example of inviting listeners to feel that a 
new beginning towards better times was dawning. He achieved this 
through a combination of confession for sins past (for example, the 
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previous US tendency to categorise Muslim-majority states as defined 
according to the communist or democratic camps during the Cold 
War); recognition of the interconnectedness of American prosperity 
and Muslim contributions; declarations about the universality of 
fundamental human rights, wants and needs; and intellectual and 
emotional generosity in drawing inspiration, at the end of his speech, 
equally from the Koran, the Talmud and the Holy Bible.27 
In Australia, too, James Curran (in his book, The Power of Speech) 
has written on prime ministers and the ways in which they have derived 
authority through compelling articulations of Australian nationalism. 
Curran argues that since the 1970s it has been very important for 
Australian prime ministers to speak to Australian values and national 
ideals, not only to win the electorate's support, but in order to main-
tain their positions of authority within their respective parties, who 
have come to expect this of them. It did not have to be heavily fact-
laden history, but it did need to be sentient history, 'felt' history about 
who we imagined we were. Those who did it best, argues Curran, 
were those who were able to establish continuity with the present, 
so that listeners felt that they were living out the legacy of what had 
come before. 28 This conclusion, I suggest, applies generally rather than 
purely to Australian circumstances. 
In exploring the significance of history for leaders projecting 
messages that have PD-type qualities, I do not want to deny new social 
media an important role in reaching broad audiences quickly and in 
providing a means for popular levels of engagement with a nation's 
projections and standing in the world. There is something special 
about the way in which Indian authorities blend India's trajectory in 
world affairs with India's embrace of communications technology. As 
others have said, including Shashi Tharoor, it is most .fitting that India, 
an IT powerhouse, makes maximum use of social media to inform 
the Indian public of India's interests and activities in the world. The 
official sites for Indian PD also emphasise India's booming technology 
sector and the country's largest English-speaking population in the 
world as jumping ·points for venturing into this mode of diplomacy 
and as scene-setting for India's rising international standing. 29 More 
traditional publications, such as the annual collection of documents, 
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India's Foreign Relations, build further the feeling of international take-
off by detailing India's spectacular economic growth, its technological 
and communications successes, and its ongoing efforts to address 
problems of global dimensions, including the developmental needs 
of other nations and attempts to mitigate climate change and policy 
around the use of energy resources.30 
Amidst what is an admirable air of excitement there is a slightly 
elusive quality about the scope of the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs' involvement in it. In saying that 'public diplomacy activities 
often present many differing views as represented by private individu-
als and organizations in addition to official Government views and 
positions'31 there is a suggestion of ministerial facilitation of things 
that then run independently, or even ministerial noting of other goings 
on if and when the department learns of them. There is not much 
history in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' PD messages, which 
are arguably directed internally, at Indians, as much as externally, 
and are set to expand with a new, and very logical, focus on Indian 
diasporas overseas. I should add, too, that amidst the social media, 
the PD Division of MEA has a robust set of publications, seminars 
and conferences, distinguished lecture series and visitors programs. 
For historical content, to my mind, there's an unfortunate gap in the 
Indian Council for Cultural Relations, the programs and activities of 
which are fascinating, but at some remove from the excitement of the 
new wave of PD. 
In significant ways the diplomatic game has changed; but in 
making the case for continued engagement with history I am thinking 
about those publicly aimed messages that will survive when specific 
foreign policies strike trouble. India's early forays in PD in the 1940s 
and 1950s involved an 'intermingling' of Indian challenges and visions 
with those of the international order, and however unreachable some 
of the ideals of one world were, some core ideals survived immediate 
gains and losses in foreign policy stakes. If we do not ask too much 
of PD today, if we are content with an 'intermingling' of state and 
non-state agencies, or the 'milieu factors' making up the environment 
that Melissen speaks of, then there are some compelling reasons for 
persisting with it, and with a historical sensibility attached. 
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Finally, modern-day India is well placed again, not perhaps to 
resume Nehru's mission, but to occupy a role in world affairs that 
speaks to both universal and specific concerns: the role of man, if you 
like, in the Greek schema of cosmos, standing between macrocosm 
and microcosm. I'm not sure that India summarises the cosmos in the 
way that man was supposed to, but India's concerns still speak very 
readily to world concerns, and that is a strong basis from which to 
engage in popularly directed acts of understanding cultures, attitudes 
and behaviour; building and managing relationships; and influencing 
opinions and actions to advance interests and values. 
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